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THE DATA PRIVACY COMPROMISE:
RECONCILING STATE AND FEDERAL
REGULATORY REGIMES ON THE PATH TO
PREEMPTION
Mi T. Tran
Today, it is easier than ever before for business entities to collect
and sell our data, and most consumers lack comprehensive knowledge of
how they can protect their data or recognize the true extent of potential
exposure. Although data privacy regulation is gearing up among U.S.
states, federal legislators have been stagnant in regard to passing a federal data privacy law. Without clearer, broader protections for consumers, many will be left to deal with overlapping laws and confusing procedures for pursuing legal remedies.
The relationship between federal and state regulation is best maintained when Congress carefully balances the different roles of each. In
the context of data privacy, some legislators believe that the states should
enact their own laws without federal interference, as some already have,
while others believe that federal preemption is imperative to achieving
the most efficient protection for consumer data. As the pressure piles on
for Congress to pass a federal privacy law, a balanced approach is key
to moving forward. This Note proposes a happy medium and explores a
multilayered approach to preemption to achieve a uniform baseline for
protection without displacing the states’ valuable regulatory role in the
data privacy sphere.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’ groundbreaking law review
article famously introduced the concept of privacy rights in the late
1800s.1 Back then, the implications of privacy were exclusively maintained in the physical sphere and predated the innovative technologies
of the modern world.2 Today, daily life has become integrated with
advanced technologies, with all of the conveniences and inconveniences that come from living in a digital age. Online communities and
platforms are pervasive and continue to expand, and nowadays, technology permeates virtually every industry, including communication,
education, business and commerce, and even healthcare.3 As a result,
the aforementioned privacy challenges moved beyond the physical
realm into the digital domain, and the concept of “information privacy” was born.4 With social media platforms, advertising companies,
online businesses, and even government entities collecting personal
data, the risk of privacy violations has increased. Alan Westin, a privacy scholar and advocate, argued that individuals should have control
over their personal data, including the amount of information disclosed, maintained, disseminated, and to whom.5 Recently, the digital
industry has been garnering negative attention over the increase in data
breaches and invasions of privacy relating to the collection, processing, and selling of individuals’ personal information.6 Federal

1. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
2. See generally id. (discussing individuals’ rights to protect the privacy of their lives from
physical and mental invasions of others).
3. Jack Turner, The 7 Main Ways Technology Impacts Your Daily Life, TECH.CO (May 5,
2021, 12:01 AM), https://tech.co/vpn/main-ways-technology-impacts-daily-life [https://perma.cc
/9E5F-4XFT].
4. Alan Westin expanded the concept of privacy beyond bodily autonomy, defining the right
to privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when,
how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others.” ALAN F. WESTIN,
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).
5. Luisa Rollenhagen, Alan Westin Is the Father of Modern Data Privacy Law, OSANO
(Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.osano.com/articles/alan-westin [https://perma.cc/K73M-2AAR].
6. Michael Hill & Dan Swinhoe, The 15 Biggest Data Breaches of the 21st Century, CSO
(July 16, 2021, 2:00 AM), https://www.csoonline.com/article/2130877/the-biggest-data-breachesof-the-21st-century.html [https://perma.cc/VZX8-SG6D]. See generally Thorin Klosowski, The
State of Consumer Data Privacy Laws in the US (And Why It Matters), WIRECUTTER (Sept. 6,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/wirecutter/blog/state-of-privacy-laws-in-us/ [https://perma.cc/S8
EN-YXY9] (discussing recent data leaks and breaches).
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governments around the world are responding to public outcry by enacting data privacy regulations,7 but the United States has fallen behind, taking a limited sectoral approach to regulation. Although federal legislators introduced bills early on, the conversation has stalled
due to polarizing views on whether data privacy should be regulated
by state or federal government entities.8 In response to the lack of federal action, state governments have begun to address the widespread
threats to data privacy, leading with the California Consumer Privacy
Act of 2018 (CCPA).9 The CCPA pioneered state regulatory efforts to
curb abuses of personal data collection and use, and its stringent protections for consumers inspired many other states to introduce similar
bills.10 Since the CCPA has taken effect, industry advocates have begun to lobby for a federal baseline privacy law, and there has been a
recent influx of federal bills proposed in both the House and Senate.11

7. The European Union enacted the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), a regulation that applies to all EU members states and is currently the strongest privacy law in the world.
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of Apr. 27, 2016, on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to
the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) [hereinafter GDPR]; General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), INTERSOFT CONSULTING, https://gdpr-info.eu/ [https://perma
.cc/XXB9-RHRZ].
8. One roadblock to negotiation over new legislation is whether a federal law should preempt
existing state laws. Lauren Feiner, Lawmakers Kick the Can Down the Road on Discussing the
Most Contentious Issues of Privacy Legislation, CNBC (Feb. 9, 2020, 4:34 PM), https://www.cnbc
.com/2020/02/08/lawmakers-postpone-discussing-contentious-privacy-legislation-issues.html [htt
ps://perma.cc/SH4L-ELZR]. Last year, draft legislation and indications of privacy hearings in Congress failed to materialize. Cameron F. Kerry, One Year After Schrems II, the World Is Still Waiting
for U.S. Privacy Legislation, BROOKINGS (Aug. 16, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu
/techtank/2021/08/16/one-year-after-schrems-ii-the-world-is-still-waiting-for-u-s-privacy-legislati
on/ [https://perma.cc/XJP4-UMP5].
9. “The California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), enacted in 2018, created new consumer
rights relating to the access to, deletion of, and sharing of personal information that is collected by
businesses.” Golden Data Law, A Guide to the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), MEDIUM
(Oct. 14, 2019), https://medium.com/golden-data/a-guide-to-the-california-consumer-privacy-actccpa-3a916756ed36 [https://perma.cc/MS5X-9XKT]; Ben Adler, California Passes Strict Internet
Privacy Law with Implications for the Country, NPR (June 29, 2018, 5:05 AM), https://www.npr
.org/2018/06/29/624336039/california-passes-strict-internet-privacy-law-with-implications-forthe-country [https://perma.cc/8NYC-FFYH].
10. Taylor Kay Lively, US State Privacy Legislation Tracker, IAPP, https://iapp.org/resources
/article/us-state-privacy-legislation-tracker/ [https://perma.cc/U2JH-NVZ6] (last updated Feb. 24,
2022).
11. Müge Fazlioglu, US Federal Privacy Legislation Tracker, IAPP, https://iapp.org/re
sources/article/us-federal-privacy-legislation-tracker/ [https://perma.cc/FM33-GJ3H] (last updated
Aug. 2, 2021).
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The pressure for congressional action is increasing, but legislators
must carefully balance state and federal interests and consider the consequences of preemption for consumers and businesses before setting
a national standard that will reshape the future of U.S. data privacy.
The CCPA has been in effect for more than a year, and as various state
laws continue to appear, the need for uniformity will increase. The
time for a federal privacy law is now, but to what extent can the new
law preempt existing state regulation without watering down protections or displacing important remedial measures?12 This Note will explore possible answers to this question and propose that, while some
form of federal preemption is inevitable, taking a layered approach to
federal preemption will set a uniform, national baseline for enforcement while preserving the states’ valuable role in the data privacy
sphere.
Part II gives an overview of modern data privacy implications for
consumers and businesses.13 Part III will discuss the relationship between federal and state governments in response to data privacy issues
and the increasing friction between federal and state interests.14 Part
IV examines different approaches to preemption and how Congress
has balanced federal and state interests in other areas of privacy.15 Finally, Part V will discuss a recently proposed Senate bill and recommend that taking a layered approach to preemption is the most effective method to reconcile federal and state privacy interests.16 As
illustrated by a report from the Brookings Institution,17 legislators
should revise the existing bill, based on preemption concepts from
other federal statutes in the privacy arena, and add a sunset clause to
reassess the new law’s impact in the near future.18

12. Stacey Gray, Navigating Preemption Through the Lens of Existing State Privacy Laws,
FUTURE OF PRIV. F. (July 2, 2021), https://fpf.org/blog/navigating-preemption-through-the-lens-of
-existing-state-privacy-laws/ [https://perma.cc/D3KD-RS8N].
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra Part V.
17. The Brookings Institution, also known as “Brookings,” is an American nonprofit public
policy organization, where experts conduct independent government research to analyze and solve
problems in many areas, including national privacy affairs, and publish policy recommendations.
Brookings Institution, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Brookings_Institution [https://perma
.cc/QR45-D2GC].
18. Brookings researchers published a report detailing their policy recommendations regarding federal privacy legislation and offering a baseline framework to address the consequences of
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II. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR
CONSUMERS AND BUSINESSES
“Cyberspace is our new arena for public and private activities.”19
Due to evolving technology advancements and the growth of the digital industry, the physical world has become enmeshed with the virtual
world in an information era where it is becoming increasingly difficult
to keep anything offline. Nowadays, the convenience, and even necessity, of doing everything online—shopping, socializing, banking, and
utilizing healthcare services—has contributed to the exponential
growth of data generated on the internet, mostly consisting of individuals’ personal information.20 As technology has continued to evolve,
personal data can be collected from any device that is tied to the digital
sphere, such as cell phones, “smart” home appliances, and mobile applications.21 Companies, organizations, and even government entities
are collecting personal data from every corner of the digital landscape.22 Individuals’ personal information that was once considered
private and easily controlled by users is now commodified in the marketplace, fueling the internet economy and holding high profit value
to organizations like online retailers and big technology companies
who stand to benefit from collecting and selling such information.23

preemption for both state and federal interests. This Note explores two key components of Brookings’ “tiered approach” to federal preemption of state privacy laws—revising an existing bill and
adding a sunset clause—because they offer the most balanced consideration of state and federal
regulatory systems. CAMERON F. KERRY ET AL., BRIDGING THE GAPS: A PATH FORWARD TO
FEDERAL PRIVACY LEGISLATION 16–19 (2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads
/2020/06/Bridging-the-gaps_a-path-forward-to-federal-privacy-legislation.pdf [https://perma.cc
/X9AU-AT6Q].
19. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1610
(1999).
20. See Robert Muggah, Digital Privacy Comes at a Price. Here’s How to Protect It, WORLD
ECON. F. (Sept. 8, 2021), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/09/how-to-protect-digital-priv
acy [https://perma.cc/G3ZK-X86E]. See generally Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII
Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1814 (2011) (discussing when information should be considered “personally identifiable information”).
21. See Rani Molla, People Say They Care About Privacy but They Continue to Buy Devices
That Can Spy on Them, VOX (May 13, 2019, 5:40 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/5/13/18
547235/trust-smart-devices-privacy-security [https://perma.cc/9EDF-NJ7W].
22. See Aliza Vigderman & Gabe Turner, The Data Big Tech Companies Have on You,
SECURITY.ORG (Aug. 23, 2021), https://www.security.org/resources/data-tech-companies-have/
[https://perma.cc/MZS4-DKP4].
23. Kendra Clark, Will Tech Companies or Regulators Have the Final Say in Our Privacy
Debate?, THE DRUM (Nov. 16, 2021), https://www.thedrum.com/news/2021/11/16/will-tech-comp
anies-or-regulators-have-the-final-say-our-privacy-debate [https://perma.cc/DJG6-4L38].
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As a result, information privacy has emerged as a hot-button issue surrounding the consequences of a data-driven society.
The collection of personal data can greatly benefit individuals,
businesses, and society at large,24 but there is also a potential risk of
privacy harms.25 After the recent uptick in record-breaking data
breaches,26 the general response to the commodification of individuals’ personal data has been bleak. A 2017 study of the digital privacy
environment found that “many Americans fear they have lost control
of their personal information and many worry whether government
agencies and major corporations can protect the customer data they
collect.”27 Despite citizens’ mounting distrust in the United States’
data protection practices, the legislative response has been underwhelming and insufficient. At the federal level, regulators continue to
rely on sector-specific laws and regulations—some of which fail to
adequately protect data—to address privacy harms.28 In addition,
many state laws addressing one privacy issue can lead to varying degrees of compliance and incompatible provisions, as demonstrated by
24. Jules Polonetsky & Omer Tene, Privacy and Big Data: Making Ends Meet, 66 STAN. L.
REV. 25, 25 (2013) (“Big data creates tremendous opportunity for the world economy not only in
the field of national security, but also in areas ranging from marketing and credit risk analysis to
medical research and urban planning.”).
25. “The risks [of personal data collection] include possibilities for surveillance, loss of privacy, discrimination and loss of reputation and autonomy.” Jack Teng et al., Data Collected by
Governments Can Be Useful to Researchers, but Only When Accessed Carefully, THE
CONVERSATION (July 31, 2019, 6:57 PM), https://theconversation.com/data-collected-by-govern
ments-can-be-useful-to-researchers-but-only-when-accessed-carefully-116579 [https://perma.cc
/HV3U-QUHF].
26. In the last few years, there were massive breaches of sensitive personal data that affected
a vast number of individuals. See, e.g., Nicole Perlroth, All 3 Billion Yahoo Accounts Were Affected
by 2013 Attack, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/03/technology/yah
oo-hack-3-billion-users.html [https://perma.cc/H2MW-3ULE] (billions of email accounts were
compromised); Seena Gressin, The Equifax Data Breach: What to Do, FED. TRADE COMM’N
(Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2017/09/equifax-data-breach-what-do [https://
perma.cc/JW6V-TGXH] (hackers accessed names, Social Security numbers, birth dates, addresses,
driver’s license numbers, and credit card numbers belonging to users of a major credit reporting
agency); Eric Newcomer, Uber Paid Hackers to Delete Stolen Data on 57 Million People,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 21, 2017, 8:21 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-21
/uber-concealed-cyberattack-that-exposed-57-million-people-s-data [https://perma.cc/5TXR-NSM
R] (compromised data included names, addresses, and phone numbers of Uber riders and drivers
around the world).
27. Kenneth Olmstead & Aaron Smith, Americans and Cybersecurity, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2017/01/26/americans-and-cybersecurity/
[https://perma.cc/X5P8-F334].
28. Nuala O’Connor, Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection and Privacy, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN RELS. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-approach-data-protect
ion [https://perma.cc/GR26-AJXP].
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the forty-eight state data breach laws.29 “U.S. citizens and companies
suffer from this uneven approach—citizens because their data is not
adequately protected, and companies because they are saddled with
contradictory and sometimes competing requirements.”30 While the
legal rights provided by different state privacy laws only apply to residents of each respective state, the nature of conducting business
online makes it highly likely that a company will be a covered entity
in multiple states and thus subjected to competing or incompatible
state law provisions.31 Despite these concerns, any attempts to pass
federal privacy laws in the last decade “failed to get off the ground.”32
The regulation of data privacy has far-reaching implications that
affect the interests of commercial industries, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and consumers.33 Congressional action
will undoubtedly shape the future of data privacy, so it is vital that
legislators consider different perspectives and regulatory approaches
as they move forward with structuring a federal privacy law.
III. THE PATCHWORK OF FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATION OF
CONSUMER PRIVACY
A. The Limited Federal Sectoral Approach to Regulating Privacy
The United States, despite being home to some of the most advanced technology data companies in the world, lacks a comprehensive federal privacy law that regulates the use and collection of personal information.34 Instead, the United States has taken a narrowly
29. Depending on the state, one will find different and sometimes conflicting definitions of
“breach,” the types of personal information protected, the entities that are covered, and enforcement
procedures. Id.
30. Id.
31. For example, the CCPA covers entities that “do[] business in California” and buy, receive,
or sell the personal information of “50,000 or more [California] consumers, households, or devices”
and does not require a business to be physically located in California. California Consumer Privacy
Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(c) (West 2018).
32. Dan Clark, A Plea for Protection: Will a Federal Data Privacy Law Save the Day?,
YAHOO!: LAW.COM (Feb. 4, 2019, 2:33 PM), https://www.yahoo.com/now/plea-protection-federal
-data-privacy-023303428.html [https://perma.cc/SG3F-L4CA].
33. The potential national effects have been illustrated by the GDPR, the toughest privacy and
security law in the world, that protects all consumers in the EU and requires virtually all businesses
to comply. Rob Sobers, A Year in the Life of the GDPR: Must-Know Stats and Takeaways,
VARONIS, https://www.varonis.com/blog/gdpr-effect-review/ [https://perma.cc/SXR5-75US] (last
updated June 17, 2020).
34. O’Connor, supra note 28; Melody McAnally & Jennifer Svilar, U.S. Privacy Law: Past,
Present and Future, JD SUPRA (Sept. 20, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/u-s-privacylaw-past-present-and-future-4213418/ [https://perma.cc/Z3PA-6YHA].
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tailored sectoral approach to personal data protection by regulating
specific types of data and populations.35 More than a decade ago, many
industries preferred the sectoral model because there was more leeway
to self-regulate, and some organizations avoided regulation altogether
by falling into one of the gaps left by the patchwork of laws. 36 However, in the context of modern digital privacy, the sectoral model has
become outdated when compared to other jurisdictions, like the European Union, which regulates privacy using an omnibus model.37 The
gaps narrowed as more laws were passed, and organizations today are
often regulated by overlapping laws, leading to inconsistency and uncertainty—especially as technology continues to expand.38 For example, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and the
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule (COPPA) both address
children’s personal information,39 but they intersect and sometimes
conflict with each other, leading to a lack of clarity on protections.40
Another prominent example illustrating uncertainty is the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the primary

35. Klosowski, supra note 6 (describing a mixture of federal laws that regulate limited areas
such as health information, credit reports, student education records, and data collection of children
under the age of 13).
36. Daniel Solove, The Growing Problems with the Sectoral Approach to Privacy Law,
TEACH PRIV. (Nov. 13, 2015), https://teachprivacy.com/problems-sectoral-approach-privacy-law/
[https://perma.cc/SYK8-MDPT].
37. See, e.g., GDPR, supra note 7.
38. Solove, supra note 36.
39. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2018); 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2018). FERPA withholds funds from
state schools and districts that deny parents access to the records maintained about their children
and that disclose their children’s personally identifiable information without parental consent. 20
U.S.C. § 1232g (2018). COPPA allows parents to decide when and how personal information about
their children is collected, used, and disclosed online by commercial operators. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–
6506 (2018).
40. See Dian Schaffhauser, The Problems with FERPA and COPPA in 21st Century Learning,
THE JOURNAL (Dec. 5, 2017), https://thejournal.com/Articles/2017/12/05/The-Problems-with-FE
RPA-and-COPPA-in-21st-Century-Learning.aspx [https://perma.cc/L7ZQ-79GM]. “[Educational
technology] ‘vendors and educators still have difficulty understanding how best to comply with
COPPA in the educational context and FERPA in the digital context’ . . . . For example, ‘directory
information is opt-out under FERPA, but much of that information is protected as opt-in under
COPPA.’” Id. By way of example, a user “opts in” by taking an affirmative action, such as marking
a checkbox on a website, to offer their consent, where the checkboxes are unmarked by default.
“Opt-out” is the opposite, where the checkboxes are already marked by default, but the user may
withdraw consent by actively unchecking the box. KJ Dearie, Opt In vs Opt Out, TERMLY (Sept. 28,
2021), https://termly.io/resources/articles/opt-in-vs-opt-out/#opt-in-opt-out-whats-the-difference
[https://perma.cc/QY2W-GPG4].
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health privacy law in the United States, which regulates “covered entities” that hold “individually identifiable health information.”41 As
health information is increasingly collected, shared, or used by new
types of organizations beyond the traditional health care organizations
covered by HIPAA, consumers “may incorrectly think HIPAA provides standards for privacy and security in all contexts where their
health information is collected, shared, or used.”42
The primary enforcer of federal privacy and data security issues
is the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), an agency with the broadest
federal jurisdiction to protect consumer privacy.43 The FTC is tasked
with protecting consumers and competition from “deceptive and unfair business practices,” reaching diverse sectors such as retail, advertising, credit reporting, health, and more.44 The FTC exercises its authority in one of two ways. First, it can act on privacy-specific
statutory authority from Congress. Under these statutes, the FTC has
the power to bring civil cases against entities that violate specific statutory provisions.45 For example, COPPA,46 the Fair Credit Reporting
Act (FCRA),47 and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act48 are federal statutes
that explicitly give the FTC regulatory authority to protect consumer
privacy—either with rulemaking, enforcement, or both.
Second, outside of the sector-specific framework, section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) is the sole alternative to a
general privacy law, and authorizes the FTC to take civil action against
41. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936.
42. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., EXAMINING OVERSIGHT OF THE PRIVACY &
SECURITY OF HEALTH DATA COLLECTED BY ENTITIES NOT REGULATED BY HIPAA 4 (2016),
https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/non-covered_entities_report_june_17_2016.pdf [https
://perma.cc/E7VV-NK9L].
43. About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc [https://perma.cc/LJ
3D-MVD6].
44. Id.
45. Thomas Pahl, Your Cop on the Privacy Beat, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Apr. 20, 2017, 11:12
AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2017/04/your-cop-privacy-beat [https
://perma.cc/D5AW-JMUL].
46. COPPA exclusively empowers the FTC with the authority to make and enforce rules protecting the personal information of children under the age of thirteen. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501, 6506
(2018).
47. The FCRA exclusively empowers the FTC to enforce, but not make, rules protecting information collected by consumer reporting agencies such as credit bureaus, medical information
companies, and tenant screening services. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018).
48. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act empowers the FTC to enforce, but not make, rules ensuring
that financial institutions protect the privacy of consumers’ personal financial information. GrammLeach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6801 et seq. (2018).
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any private entities that use “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce.”49 Under section 5, the FTC has pursued privacy
and data security cases against “social media companies, mobile app
developers, data brokers, ad tech industry participants, retailers, and
companies in the Internet of Things space.”50 In general, industry entities are permitted to self-regulate consumer data privacy practices,
with minimal federal intervention, which is mainly derived from the
FTC’s section 5 authorization to sue entities that violate the FTCA.51
The FTC has been exercising its enforcement authority over data privacy violations since the 1990s, starting with its lawsuit in 1998
against the web platform called “GeoCities.”52 This was a seminal
case that laid the groundwork for the FTC’s continued expansion over
the next two decades and the presently ongoing discussions about data
privacy regulation.53 Since 1998, the FTC has brought hundreds of
cases against private entities, large and small, to protect the privacy of
consumer data.54 Although many cases resulted in settlement agreements and never reach a judicial decision, industry entities used these
agreements as guidelines for their privacy practices.55 As such, the
49. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2018).
50. FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC REPORT TO CONGRESS ON PRIVACY AND SECURITY 1 (2021),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/ftc-report-congress-privacy-security/report_
to_congress_on_privacy_and_data_security_2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5A8-VH26].
51. “Self-regulation is a broad concept that includes any attempt by an industry to moderate
its conduct with the intent of improving marketplace behavior for the ultimate benefit of consumers.
Self-regulatory organizations typically include private groups . . . .” Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Self Regulatory Organizations and the FTC 2 (Apr. 11, 2005), https://
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/self-regulatory-organizations-and-ft
c/050411selfregorgs.pdf [https://perma.cc/TG6F-8C5X].
52. Rachel Withers, Before Facebook, There Was GeoCities, SLATE (Apr. 16, 2018, 8:07
AM), https://slate.com/technology/2018/04/the-ftcs-1998-case-against-geocities-laid-the-ground
work-for-facebook-debates-today.html [https://perma.cc/A2JP-9KQF]. “[J]ust as GeoCities was
preparing to go public, the FTC launched a complaint against the site, as part of its crackdown on
online privacy practices. The FTC alleged that GeoCities was lying to its customers by misrepresenting how it was using their personal information and was therefore in violation of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.” Id.
53. See id.
54. “In a wide range of cases, the FTC has alleged that companies made deceptive claims
about how they collect, use, and share consumer data [and] failed to provide reasonable security
for consumer data . . . spammed and defrauded consumers . . . shared highly sensitive, private consumer data with unauthorized third parties . . .” and more. Comment of the Staff of the Bureau of
Consumer Protection of the Federal Trade Commission Comment, WC Docket No. 16-106, at 4–5
(May 27, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/comment-staff
-bureau-consumer-protection-federal-trade-commission-federal-communications-commission/160
527fcccomment.pdf [https://perma.cc/MV2Q-TDDG].
55. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 585 (2014).
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spread of the FTC’s privacy jurisprudence functionally operates as a
“body of common law,” where the FTC has codified certain norms
and standards, developing baseline privacy protections for consumers.56 These standards have become specific enough to resemble rules
that self-regulating entities find useful.57 Aside from exercising its enforcement and regulatory powers, the FTC regularly publishes reports
and makes recommendations to federal legislators.58 The culmination
of the these efforts in the data privacy landscape has bolstered the
FTC’s experience and flexibility over decades of regulatory work,
even with limited resources and minimal congressional support.59
Nevertheless, the self-regulatory approach is limited, largely due to
the lack of explicit statutory direction. Self-regulation is voluntary by
definition, so these entities are not necessarily confined to industry
standards.60 Furthermore, the FTC’s approach is mostly reactive and
relies on conducting market studies, writing reports, and initiating incremental change through civil enforcement.61 Importantly, the reach
of section 5’s protections against “deceptive and unfair acts” is limited, particularly in pursuing “unfairness” violations.62 The FTC has
opined that consumers need additional protections beyond the scope
of what section 5 can offer, especially as consumer technologies and
complex privacy issues continue to evolve.63

56. Id. at 586.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 50 (discussing areas for improvement, the
need for additional resources, and requesting Congressional action on the FTC’s authority).
59. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 55, at 676.
60. Jedidiah Bracy, Will Industry Self-Regulation Be Privacy’s Way Forward?, IAPP
(June 24, 2014), https://iapp.org/news/a/will-industry-self-regulation-be-privacys-way-forward/
[https://perma.cc/8E5H-UBNG].
61. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY—UPDATE: 2018 2–3 (2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/privacy-data-security-update-2018/2018-priv
acy-data-security-report-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/SST8-DRT3].
62. “An act or practice is unfair if (1) it causes or is likely to cause substantial injury, (2) the
injury is not reasonably avoidable by consumers, and (3) the injury is not outweighed by benefits
to consumers or competition.” FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC REPORT TO CONGRESS ON PRIVACY
AND SECURITY, supra note 50, at 1. The requirements for proving unfairness are more substantial
than deceptiveness, and if all three prongs are not satisfied, the FTC cannot bring a case under
section 5. Id.
63. “While FTC enforcement can help police the most pernicious and deceptive practices in
the marketplace, the agency must develop a clear theory of substantial likelihood of harm to consumers . . . . The harm requirement imposes some limitations around how far the FTC can pursue
aggressive uses of sensitive data.” Terrell McSweeny, Psychographics, Predictive Analytics, Artificial Intelligence, & Bots: Is the FTC Keeping Pace?, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 514, 522 (2018).
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While the FTC has played an important gap-filling role in the federal regulatory scheme, commentators have questioned whether the
agency—with limited capabilities and lacking resources—has the
ability to handle future privacy harms.64 In a recent settlement with
Facebook, the FTC fined the social media giant $5 billion and required
Facebook to “implement changes to its privacy practices” for allegedly making “deceptive claims about consumers’ ability to control the
privacy of their personal data.”65 Critics felt that the settlement was
too limited to provide sufficient redress, contending that the $5 billion
fine was merely a “drop in the bucket compared to Facebook’s profits . . . . [T]he FTC did not change Facebook’s fundamental business
model nor hold Mark Zuckerberg, the CEO, personally liable” for the
privacy harms.66
Regardless of the FTC’s drawbacks, it is likely still the best
agency to help regulate and enforce a federal data privacy law—it has
decades of experience in the data privacy realm, it has proven itself to
be adaptable to new technologies, and it would be easier to provide the
FTC with new tools and resources than build a new regulatory agency
from the ground up.67 With the right resources and better support from
Congress, the FTC will be able to “rise to the [privacy] challenge.”68
However, these developments will take a few years before the FTC
can be effective, so the pressure to enact a federal baseline privacy law
still remains.69 In the absence of adequate federal regulation, states
have become the frontrunners of data privacy regulation.

64. See id. at 525, 530.
65. Lesley Fair, FTC’s $5 Billion Facebook Settlement: Record-breaking and History-making,
FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 24, 2019, 8:52 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/businessblog/2019/07/ftcs-5-billion-facebook-settlement-record-breaking-history [https://perma.cc/6353-4
7SA].
66. Chris J. Hoofnagle et al., The FTC Can Rise to the Privacy Challenge, but Not Without
Help from Congress, BROOKINGS (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019
/08/08/the-ftc-can-rise-to-the-privacy-challenge-but-not-without-help-from-congress/ [https://per
ma.cc/LJ9N-689M].
67. “The prevailing thought among . . . companies and . . . legislators is that the Federal Trade
Commission would be the body that governs whatever kind of comprehensive law is passed.” Clark,
supra note 32.
68. Hoofnagle et al., supra note 66.
69. Id.
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B. The Significance of Emerging State Privacy Laws
The relationship between federal and state governments creates
opportunities for policy experimentation in regulation,70 and states
have played a vital role, particularly in complex areas such as privacy.
The Supreme Court and federal legislators have long acknowledged
that state governments function as “laboratories of democracy,”71
which are “places where governmental innovations can begin and
spread” and “flow[] naturally from a federalist system.”72 A key feature of these laboratories is that state legislators have the flexibility to
quickly identify unique privacy issues and have often pioneered regulatory approaches before the federal government took action.73 Speed
and flexibility is important in the context of digital privacy, where
technology advances more rapidly than the law can keep up with.74
While the Supreme Court has declined to parse the nuances of state
laboratories or discuss definite conditions for their success, most commentators have agreed that state laboratories are valuable to furthering
national interests.75
A prime example of state laboratories at work in regulating digital
privacy occurred in the early 2000s, when the public became increasingly concerned about the harms of unauthorized data access.76 California initiated policy experimentation by enacting the first data
70. Hannah J. Wiseman & Dave Owen, Federal Laboratories of Democracy, 52 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1119, 1121 (2018).
71. Id. at 1125; see also Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S.
Ct. 2652, 2673 (2015) (“[T]he States may perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to
devise various solutions where the best solution is far from clear.” (quoting U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
72. Wiseman & Owen, supra note 70, at 1125.
73. Joanne McNabb, Can Laboratories of Democracy Innovate the Way to Privacy Protection?, CENTURY FOUND. (Apr. 5, 2018), https://tcf.org/content/report/can-laboratories-democracyinnovate-way-privacy-protection/ [https://perma.cc/5YLF-G2H8]. (“States have been the source of
numerous privacy innovations in past years, including laws on identity theft victim rights, data
breach notification, limitations on the use of Social Security numbers, cell phone data privacy,
cybersecurity, and cyber-exploitation.”).
74. Daniel Malan, The Law Can’t Keep Up with New Tech. Here’s How to Close the Gap,
WORLD ECON. F. (June 21, 2018), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/06/law-too-slow-fornew-tech-how-keep-up/ [https://perma.cc/5VSY-YEX5] (“Given the . . . extraordinarily fast technological and social change . . . government legislation . . . [is] likely to be out-of-date or redundant
by the time [it is] implemented.”).
75. Wiseman & Owen, supra note 70, at 1129–30 (“The implicit assumptions . . . appear to
be that experimentalism will automatically emerge from federalist governance and that the locus
of experimentation will be the states.”).
76. Juliana De Groot, The History of Data Breaches, DIGIT. GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2020),
https://digitalguardian.com/blog/history-data-breaches [https://perma.cc/PS9W-6S5E].
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breach notification statute in 2003, which requires individuals to be
notified if their personal information is compromised.77 Forty-eight
states followed suit by enacting their own data breach notification
laws.78 During that same period, several federal bills were proposed,
but none came to fruition.79 As of today, every U.S. state has its own
data breach notification law, providing a useful outline for federal legislators to finally pass a federal data breach notification statute in
2019.80 Even after a federal law was passed, states have continued
their policy experimentation by regulating more nuanced issues
caused by data breaches. For example, some states have amended their
notification timelines,81 while others have focused on expanding notification requirements to cover insurance companies.82
While these state laboratory experiments have proved useful,
waiting for state-by-state legislation, which can take years, results in
less comprehensive privacy protections. Indeed, it took more than fifteen years for all fifty states to enact data breach notification laws, and
federal legislation addressing data breach notifications did not materialize until 2019.83 The cumbersome issue with enacting piecemeal privacy protections over a long period of time is the resulting patchwork
of laws that can cause difficulties with compliance, mainly because

77. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.29, 1798.82 (West 2009 & Supp. 2021); O’Connor, supra note
28.
78. O’Connor, supra note 28.
79. See, e.g., S. 1350, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 1326, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 1069, 109th
Cong. (2005); H.R. 5582, 109th Cong. (2006); S. 239, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 495, 110th Cong.
(2007); S. 1178, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 2221, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 139, 111th Cong. (2009).
80. Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 17,
2022), https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/securitybreach-notification-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/8FTF-A7UA]; 45 C.F.R. § 164.404 (2019) (it
should be noted that this law did not preempt state laws, but rather filled in remaining gaps).
81. Connecticut expanded its existing data breach law in several ways, which includes shortening the time businesses have to notify affected Connecticut residents and the Office of the Attorney General of a data breach from ninety days to sixty. Ryan DiSantis et al., Connecticut Expands
Data Breach Notification Requirements and Establishes a Cybersecurity “Safe Harbor,” JD
SUPRA (July 12, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/connecticut-expands-data-breach-131
9049/ [https://perma.cc/JU6J-DYYU].
82. In 2014, California’s Department of Insurance posted a notice “request[ing] that all insurers, insurance producers, and insurance support organizations provide the Insurance Commissioner
with any notices or information submitted to the Attorney General’s Office in accordance with
Civil Code § 1798.82(f).” Cal. Dep’t of Ins., Notification of Improper Personal Information Disclosures and Security Breaches (Mar. 17, 2021), https://www.insurance.ca.gov/0250-insurers/0300
-insurers/0200-bulletins/bulletin-notices-commiss-opinion/upload/NoticeToInsurersDataBreachR
eq.pdf [https://perma.cc/N269-TRJ9].
83. See supra text accompanying notes 76–80.
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the online nature of data privacy issues extends to individuals and consumers regardless of state lines. Because every state’s data breach notification statute varies significantly in scope and application, “the variations between each state’s laws create a complex and burdensome
system for companies operating across many jurisdictions.”84 Companies across the country are burdened with reconciling the differences
between requirements, usually with timing of notifications and determining the types of “personally identifiable information” covered under applicable state laws.85 Even where state laws overlap, there may
be “nuanced distinctions that make a significant impact on an entity’s
notification obligations.”86 Accordingly, the data breach notification
laws illustrate the great benefits of state laboratories, but also highlight
some of the difficulties that come with relying solely on state regulation.
Policy experimentation has reemerged in the burgeoning data privacy crisis, with California kickstarting the trend of state regulatory
responses. In 2018, the CCPA was enacted in an effort to give consumers more control over how and when others may collect, process,
and sell their personal data.87 The CCPA currently boasts the strongest
privacy protection regime, bestowing wide-ranging rights on California residents regarding their personal data, including: (1) the right to
know what personal information a business collects about them and
how it is used and shared; (2) the right to delete personal information
collected by an entity; (3) the right to opt-out of the sale of their personal information; and (4) the right to non-discrimination for exercising their CCPA rights.88 In addition to these enumerated rights, the
CCPA broadly covers any for-profit business entities “that do business
84. Mark L. Krotoski et al., The Need to Repair the Complex, Cumbersome, Costly Data
Breach Notification Maze, BLOOMBERG BNA (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.morganlewis.com/~/me
dia/files/publication/outside%20publication/article/bna-need-to-repair-data-breach-notification-m
aze-08feb16.ashx [https://perma.cc/9A3K-P7X4]. For instance, a customer’s username and security question qualify as “protected information” in California and Florida, but not in other states
like Wisconsin and Connecticut. Id.
85. Id. “While most states’ definitions of [personally identifiable information] cover similar
ground—social security number, driver’s license number, state ID card number and account or
credit/debit card number along with an access code—some states have expanded definitions of
protected [personally identifiable information] subject to the data breach notification laws, such as
a user name/e-mail address and password, and an individual’s DNA profile or unique biometric
data.” Id.
86. Id.
87. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (West 2018).
88. Id.
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in California” and meet one of three threshold requirements.89 Due to
the interconnectivity and proliferation of entities conducting business
online, and the fact that California has the largest economy whose
commerce touches nearly every other state,90 the CCPA covers a vast
amount of businesses operating in the U.S.91
The CCPA was jumpstarted by Alastair Mactaggart, who pushed
for a ballot measure92 and strongly advocated for privacy protections
against “giant corporations [that] know absolutely everything about
[consumers], [who] have no rights.”93 Mactaggart’s advocacy was a
match that struck the tinderbox of public awareness regarding the
complexities of personal data collection; the support for strong privacy
regulations began to echo through the entire state of California as concerns increased. While consumer advocates strongly supported the
most stringent protections available to consumers as provided by the
CCPA, industry stakeholders voiced concerns over workability and
compliance issues, and some stakeholders urged legislators to carve
out exemptions for certain business practices.94 Several bills were introduced to “make the law easier for businesses to comply with and
less disruptive to their operations—even if that means giving them
more control over people’s data than privacy advocates would like.”95

89. California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), CAL. OFF. OF ATT’Y GEN., https://oag.ca.gov
/privacy/ccpa [https://perma.cc/87NW-AT3Q] (“The CCPA applies to for-profit businesses that do
business in California and meet any of the following: have a gross annual revenue of over $25
million; buy, receive, or sell the personal information of 50,000 or more California residents, households, or devices; or derive fifty percent or more of their annual revenue from selling California
residents’ personal information.”).
90. Mark J. Perry, Putting America’s Enormous $21.5T Economy into Perspective by Comparing US State GDPs to Entire Countries, AM. ENTER. INST. (Feb. 5, 2020),
https://www.aei.org/carpe-diem/putting-americas-huge-21-5t-economy-into-perspective-by-comp
aring-us-state-gdps-to-entire-countries/.
91. Sarah Edri, Does the CCPA Apply to Businesses Outside of California?, TRUEVAULT
(Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.truevault.com/blog/does-the-ccpa-apply-to-businesses-outside-of-cal
ifornia [https://perma.cc/U5MD-WK2J].
92. Mark Sullivan, How the Tech Industry is Sowing Confusion About Privacy Laws, FAST
COMPANY (Apr. 9, 2021), https://www.fastcompany.com/90622991/alastair-mactaggart-california
-privacy-law-interview. “Alastair Mactaggart founded and bankrolled the privacy activism organization that pushed California’s landmark privacy law—the California Consumer Privacy Act
(CCPA)—into the books in 2018.” Id.
93. Adler, supra note 9.
94. Lobbyists for large technology companies “have quietly backed legislation that privacy
experts say would severely weaken [the CCPA].” Issie Lapowsky, Tech Lobbyists Push to Defang
California’s Landmark Privacy Law, WIRED (Apr. 29, 2019, 3:09 PM), https://www.wired.com/sto
ry/california-privacy-law-tech-lobby-bills-weaken/ [https://perma.cc/KME2-KLFN].
95. Id.
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Industry opposition was generally met with doubt from privacy advocates, who worried that industry stakeholders sought to erode consumer rights provided by the CCPA.96 Not long after the CCPA was
enacted, the costliness of state regulation of data collection became
apparent: in the continued absence of federal legislative action, a
patchwork of state data privacy laws was quickly developing.97
In the last couple of years, an increasing number of states followed in California’s footsteps and attempted to enact their own similar laws, but with varying provisions.98 Much like the phenomenon
that occurred with the patchwork of data breach notification laws, the
rise of other state privacy laws sparked concerns of compliance with
conflicting state laws, especially since the CCPA is so pervasive—
although the CCPA “does not regulate commercial conduct occurring
wholly outside of California . . . it is rare today for every part of commercial activity to occur entirely outside of the most populous state in
the country.”99 As such, any “for-profit business that operates an
online website [and] collects any information about California residents” is likely a covered entity as long as it meets one of the CCPA’s
thresholds, regardless of its home state.100 While the CCPA’s benefits
of data protection are felt across the country and praised by privacy
advocates, industry advocates are lobbying for a federal law that provides uniform rules and compliance requirements to address widening
gaps in the patchwork of privacy legislation.101
C. The Build-Up to Preemption: The Divide Between State and
Federal Interests
“More companies appear to be growing concerned with the idea
of having a jumble of and federal and state data privacy laws, especially with the passage of the [CCPA].”102 Since 2018, the CCPA has

96. Id.
97. Clark, supra note 32.
98. At the time of writing, over twenty states have introduced privacy bills, but only Colorado
and Virginia have successfully passed their respective bills. Lively, supra note 10.
99. Edri, supra note 91.
100. Id.
101. Joseph Duball, Stakeholders: Despite Setbacks, Federal Privacy Legislation Still Essential, IAPP (June 3, 2020), https://iapp.org/news/a/luminaries-say-no-time-like-the-present-for-fede
ral-privacy-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/VY9Q-EM7E].
102. Clark, supra note 32.
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already been expanded.103 In addition, Virginia and Colorado have
successfully enacted their own laws that will take effect in 2023.104
These state laws came largely in response to the budding data privacy
crisis and the public outcry for data protections, which the federal sector has only regulated in small pieces.105 In the time that has elapsed
since the CCPA became operative, proposals for federal legislation
have increased from legislators and industry stakeholders, who fear
that the CCPA is too strong and makes compliance unreasonably difficult for businesses. The implications of a federal privacy law require
discussions about whether the law should preempt existing state laws
such as those in California, Virginia, and Colorado, but advocates on
all sides have recommended different approaches: some business advocates suggest express preemption that overpowers any state laws on
data privacy, while others simply call for a less restrictive federal
law.106 On the other side of the coin, privacy advocates are concerned
with the history of failure in federal regulation of privacy issues and
worry that advocates on both sides will be unable to agree on the extent of preemption.107
The preemption conflict between federal and state interests in the
U.S. is hardly new. From a general standpoint, state legislation prioritizes the interests of the state’s constituents, which results in regulatory variations across state lines.108 Conversely, federal legislators are
more likely to prioritize national economic policies and preventing inconsistencies among state laws.109 Too much of a shift from state to
federal regulation—or vice versa—may disproportionately favor the
103. The California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA) will expand consumer rights in the CCPA and
was approved by California voters via a ballot initiative in 2020. Matthew A. Diaz & Kurt R. Hunt,
California Approves the CPRA, a Major Shift in U.S. Privacy Regulation, NAT. L. REV. (Nov. 17,
2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/california-approves-cpra-major-shift-us-privacy-reg
ulation [https://perma.cc/B8KD-FAAU].
104. S.B. 1392, 2021 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2021); S.B. 21-190, 70th Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2021).
105. See infra Section III.A.
106. See Clark, supra note 32.
107. Id.
108. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN & MICHAEL S. GREVE, FEDERAL PREEMPTION: PRINCIPLES
AND POLITICS 1 (June 2007), https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/20070604_Federal
istg.pdf.
109. Id. (“Consumer advocates . . . and state officials argue that broad federal preemption
claims . . . interfere with the states’ historic police power to protect their citizens against corporate
misconduct. In response, corporations and federal agencies insist that preemption offers a vital
safeguard against unwarranted and inconsistent state interferences with the national economy
. . . .”).
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interests of one group over the other. At this stage, sweeping federal
preemption could easily water down privacy protections and unreasonably restrict state power, which is often a valuable tool to address
consumer-related harms.110 However, excessive deference to state regulation would lead to a patchwork of privacy laws with conflicting
rules that may perpetuate unpredictability and make it difficult for entities to assess the costs and benefits of compliance.111 While industry
advocates and federal legislators have voiced the most concern over
the patchwork issue, the risks can also negatively impact consumers,
who might have a difficult time predicting which laws govern a particular situation and determine what their remedial rights are, if any.112
Consumer advocates seek to prioritize stronger privacy protections,
showing more support for the state regulatory approach because of the
robust protection it offers for consumers,113 arguing that preemption is
not necessary in the wake of the CCPA and maintaining the belief that
preemption would effectively reduce the privacy protections that
states have created.114 The dynamic between state and federal regulatory interests inevitably involves some push-and-pull from advocates
on either side of the privacy spectrum. Regardless of the criticisms
surrounding the state law patchwork issues and the effectiveness of
the CCPA, California’s massive undertaking of data privacy protection has confirmed that state action is a significant factor in data privacy regulation, because it stimulated difficult and important dialogue
among advocates of state and federal interests and ultimately com-

110. See infra Section III.B.
111. See Susan J. Stabile, Preemption of State Law by Federal Law: A Task For Congress or
the Courts?, 40 VILL. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1995) (“Those subject to a law [should] have the ability to
know not only what the law means but whether or when that law is applicable to them . . . [they]
should be able to order their primary behavior with knowledge of whether they will be subject to
federal law, state law, or both.”).
112. Id.; O’Connor, supra note 28.
113. India McKinney & Gennie Gebhart, Consumer Data Privacy Advocates to Senate Committee: Here’s How to Protect Consumers, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (May 8, 2019),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/05/consumer-data-privacy-advocates-senate-committee-heres
-how-protect-consumers [https://perma.cc/G7T9-CUDG].
114. Id.; Cristiano Lima & John Hendel, California Democrats to Congress: Don’t Bulldoze
Our Privacy Law, POLITICO (Feb. 21, 2019, 5:07 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/02/21
/congress-data-privacy-california-1185943 [https://perma.cc/5JPR-GG9T].
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pelled legislators to pay closer attention to the need for privacy legislation on a national level.115 It seems that the establishment of a baseline federal privacy law is on the horizon, but the question that remains
is: To what extent should federal legislation preempt state regulatory
power?
IV. CONTEXTUALIZING THE SPECTRUM OF PREEMPTION
In response to the CCPA, federal legislators have submitted federal bill proposals with varying levels of preemption, a cornerstone of
disagreement among advocacy groups.116 “As federal lawmakers consider proposals for a federal baseline privacy law in the United States,
one of the most complex challenges is federal preemption.”117 “Without federal preemption, state and local governments may create additional privacy laws that make compliance more complex for organizations and create contradictory requirements. . . . Competing laws
makes it more difficult to educate consumers about their privacy rights
and makes compliance more complicated for organizations,” as
demonstrated by the data breach notification laws and the emerging
patchwork of data privacy laws following the CCPA.118
“[P]reemption is a technically complex subject, as well as being
politically controversial.”119 Federal preemption is a “ubiquitous feature” of contemporary regulation in the United States, and “shapes the
regulatory environment for most major industries.”120 Its pervasiveness gave rise to debate between “proponents of broad federal preemption [who] often cite the benefits of uniform national regulations . . .
115. Among the recent federal bills introduced, the Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act was
regarded as one of the most “comprehensive privacy bills” yet, representing a promising step towards reconciling state and federal interests in the wake of preemption. Khouryanna DiPrima &
Alysa Hutnik, A National Federal Privacy Law? Check Out COPRA, the Most Comprehensive
Privacy Bill Introduced Yet, JD SUPRA (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/a-natio
nal-federal-privacy-law-check-64429/ [https://perma.cc/Y4GW-UXQA].
116. See Fazlioglu, supra note 11, for a detailed look at federal bill proposals.
117. Stacey Gray, Preemption in US Federal Privacy Laws, FUTURE OF PRIV. F. (June 14,
2021), https://fpf.org/blog/preemption-in-us-federal-privacy-laws [https://perma.cc/C76D-A28M].
118. ALAN MCQUINN & DANIEL CASTRO, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., A GRAND
BARGAIN ON DATA PRIVACY LEGISLATION FOR AMERICA 13 (Jan 14, 2019), https://www2.itif.org
/2019-grand-bargain-privacy.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HRH-YB6D].
119. Peter Swire & Pollyanna Sanderson, A Proposal to Help Resolve Federal Privacy Preemption, IAPP (Jan. 13, 2020), https://iapp.org/news/a/a-proposal-to-help-resolve-federal-privacypreemption/ [https://perma.cc/59KE-7CCY].
120. JAY B. SYKES & NICOLE VANATKO, CONG. RSCH. SRVC., R45825, FEDERAL
PREEMPTION: A LEGAL PRIMER 1 (2019), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R45825.pdf [https://perma
.cc/ZB4R-5XQZ].
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[and] opponents of broad preemption [who] often appeal to the importance of policy experimentation . . . and the ‘gap-filling’ role of
state common law in deterring harmful conduct and compensating injured plaintiffs.”121
The historical controversy surrounding preemption is replicated
in the emerging data privacy crisis: major technology and user-based
commercial industries want a uniform national law, so they naturally
seek support from federal legislators who want the same. By contrast,
consumer privacy advocates continue to emphasize the important roles
that states play in providing new protections for consumers. Federal
privacy legislation should set a national standard and preempt state
governments from passing their own laws to the extent that they would
conflict with those provisions, but legislators should tread carefully to
preserve state laws that have already had such a large impact on data
privacy.122 Further, allowing states to continue playing a role in privacy enforcement will allow efforts of gap-filling where federal legislation may fall short.123 “The most important goal of preemption analysis is to strike a proper balance between federal and state interests. .
. . By definition, preemption disputes involve lawmaking in an area in
which both the federal government and the states have the power to
legislate.”124
Federal preemption operates on a spectrum rather than being allor-nothing. Under the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause,125 Congress has the power to displace state law in two main ways: (1) express
preemption of state law by explicitly stating which state laws are
preempted; or (2) implied preemption.126 If a federal law does not expressly preempt state law, it may do so impliedly. The Supreme Court
has recognized in its jurisprudence that, even in the absence of explicit
preemption language, a federal statute can implicitly preempt state law

121. Id. at 1–2. Proponents of broad federal preemption argue that “businesses with national
operations that serve national markets will be subject to complicated, overlapping, and sometimes
even conflicting legal regimes.” Id. (quoting Alan Untereiner, The Defense of Preemption: A View
from the Trenches, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1257, 1262 (2010)).
122. See Swire & Sanderson, supra note 119.
123. Id.
124. Stabile, supra note 111, at 8–9.
125. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
126. SYKES & VANATKO, supra note 120, at 1–2.
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if Congress’s intent to do so imbues the statute’s “structure and purpose” or if nonspecific statutory language makes it clear.127 The Supreme Court has recognized two general forms of implied preemption:
field preemption128 and conflict preemption.129
Beyond preempting conflicting state laws, Congress must decide
the extent to which state regulation is permitted in order to complement the varying aspects of the federal framework.130 The following
subsections will examine federal sectoral laws and the extent to which
they preempt state laws. Analyzing the ways in which Congress has
addressed the complexities of federal preemption in the privacy sphere
can provide some insight for legislators to determine the scope of a
new federal privacy law that would, at least to some extent, preempt
existing state laws like the CCPA.131
A. Express Preemption of State Law
The CAN-SPAM Act of 2003,132 enforced by the FTC, regulates
the sending of commercial e-mails, establishing requirements of transparency and control, while also requiring businesses to respect any
consumer requests to opt-out or unsubscribe.133 In stark contrast to the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act’s deference to stronger state regulations,134 the CAN-SPAM Act “supersedes any statute, regulation,
or rule of a State or political subdivision of a State that expressly regulates the use of electronic mail to send commercial messages.”135
When the law came into effect in 2004, it automatically preempted
many existing state laws that explicitly overlapped with CAN-SPAM,

127. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009).
128. SYKES & VANATKO, supra note 120, at 17–18. Field preemption of state law occurs where
“[c]ongress has manifested an intention that the federal government occupy an entire field of regulation.” Id. at 17. Where federal regulation becomes “so pervasive” that there is “no room for
states to supplement it,” federal enforcement is “assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on
the same subject.” Id. at 17–18.
129. Preemption of conflicting state laws typically occurs when compliance with both federal
and state regulations is a physical impossibility, or the challenged state law contradicts with the full
purposes and objectives of Congress. Id. at 23–25.
130. Stacey Gray, supra note 12.
131. Id.
132. Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, 15
U.S.C. §§ 7701–7713 (2018) [hereinafter (“CAN-SPAM”)].
133. Id. § 7701.
134. See infra Section IV.B.
135. Id. § 7707(b)(1).
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even those that created stronger restrictions on spam commercial emails.136
The purpose of express preemption was to reconcile variations in
existing laws, but federal law also excluded any provisions that were
uniform across state lines, effectively watering down regulation.137
For example, most of the state laws that were preempted by CANSPAM provided individuals with private causes of action and statutory
damages, which could have effectively deterred against spammers.138
Instead, CAN-SPAM shifted all enforcement authority to the FTC
without giving the state laws an opportunity to demonstrate whether
they could successfully deter violators with other remedies.139 From
the perspective of state constituents, federal preemption unjustifiably
prevented injured individuals from seeking financially-attainable remedies.140 CAN-SPAM’s preemption of state laws was evidently too
soon, and its foundation was too weak in comparison to the existing
state laws. CAN-SPAM represents a situation where the preemption
balance was struck incorrectly, in that the federal regime improperly
interfered with state authority and resulted in negative consequences
that “watered down” privacy protections.141 Fortunately, legislators
can learn from this mistake when crafting a federal privacy law in the
future by avoiding express preemption of state privacy laws if the proposed federal law is clearly less protective. In the context of preempting stringent state laws like the CCPA, legislators should consider incorporating provisions that are at least similar in strength.
B. Preemption of Conflicting Laws
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA) is one
example of a federal law that preempts existing state laws to the extent
that there is an impossibility of compliance with multiple laws. The

136. Roger Allan Ford, Preemption of State Spam Laws by the Federal CAN-SPAM Act, 72 U.
CHI. L. REV. 355, 358 (2005).
137. See generally Rita Marie Cain, When Does Preemption Not Really Preempt? The Role of
State Law after CAN-SPAM, 3 I/S J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 751 (2008) (discussing the consequences of express preemption in the CAN-SPAM Act).
138. Id. at 760.
139. State law statutory damages ranged from $25 to $1 million per email, while individuals
under CAN-SPAM had no recourse other than to wait for spammers to “reach a critical mass and
trigger the FTC to take action.” Id.
140. Stabile, supra 111, at 10.
141. Id.
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TCPA regulates the use of automatic telephone dialing systems, placing restrictions on telemarketing calls and artificial or prerecorded
voice messages.142 Covered entities, such as telemarketers, must obtain express written consent from consumers before calling and provide opt-out mechanisms.143 The TCPA gives broad authority of enforcement and rulemaking to the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC), a federal agency similar to the FTC that is tasked
with regulating interstate and international communications.144
The TCPA’s preemption power is limited to state laws that conflict with certain interstate technical and procedural standards promulgated by the FCC.145 Private entities may petition the FCC to
preempt state telemarketing laws they believe to be in conflict with the
TCPA.146 Notably, the TCPA does not preempt state laws that provide
stronger protections against telemarketers, because stronger restrictions would not create a “physical impossibility” of compliance
with both laws; telemarketers would be required to follow whichever
law is stricter. The TCPA states: “Except for the [technical and procedural standards] prescribed, nothing in this section or in the regulations prescribed under this section shall preempt any State law that
imposes more restrictive interstate requirements . . . .”147
Following the express limitations set forth in the statute, courts
have upheld state marketing laws despite an entity’s preemption
claims if the state law creates more restrictive requirements or prohibits certain activities.148 As a result, many states today have their own
laws governing telemarketers with stricter provisions, including state
registration requirements to engage in telemarketing; prohibiting all
142. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2) (2018).
143. Id.
144. FCC Actions on Robocalls, Telemarketing, FED. COMMCN’S COMM’N,
https://www.fcc.gov/general/telemarketing-and-robocalls [https://perma.cc/ZEK6-69CC] (last updated July 23, 2018); About the FCC, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/about/over
view [https://perma.cc/WPJ9-7YC2].
145. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2018).
146. See, e.g., Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau Seeks Comment on CCAdvertising
Petition for Declaratory Ruling on Preemption of North Dakota Telemarketing Rules, 69 Fed. Reg.
61380, 61380 (Oct. 18, 2004) (a Virginia-based company that uses prerecorded messages to conduct political polling asked the FCC to preempt certain provisions of North Dakota state law, claiming that the law is inconsistent with the TCPA and the FCC’s telemarketing rules, which permit
prerecorded political polling messages).
147. 47 U.S.C. § 227(f)(1) (2018).
148. See, e.g., State ex rel. Stenehjem v. FreeEats.com, Inc., 712 N.W.2d 828, 831, 834–35
(N.D. 2006) (declining to allow preemption of a North Dakota law prohibiting interstate political
calls to state residents, even though it would otherwise be permitted under TCPA regulations).
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prerecorded messages; and requiring telemarketers to provide their
real names within the first thirty seconds of a call.149
It is true that multiple state telemarketing laws with varying levels
of restriction on telemarketers can present compliance costs for marketing companies that do business across state lines and make interstate telephone calls. However, the minimal preemption approach has
worked well in this arena, given that the compliance barriers associated with these laws are not impractical or complex like in other areas
of the digital privacy sphere—the TCPA regulates commercial telephone calls, which means that personal data under the TCPA is easily
located, through the means of tracking an individual’s geographic location using residential landlines.150 As such, marketing companies
are able to readily distinguish between differing states’ laws and ensure compliance before making calls to a particular state.151 Finally,
there are regional variations and a lack of national agreement that
make federal preemption difficult to achieve; some states ban the types
of calls made (e.g., political calls), while others ban calls depending
on the time of day.152 By contrast, a highly preemptive law like the
Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)153 had a strong national consensus
on business practices that made preemption more achievable.154
Other federal laws that have succeeded with this preemption approach include the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA),
the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 (VPPA), and the Employee
Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (EPPA).155 These statutes follow a
similar structure to the TCPA, providing a “floor” for preemption by

149. N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-28-02 (2021); ALA. CODE § 8-19A-12 (2021).
150. It is important to note, however, that the TCPA was enacted in 1991, when residential
landlines were still common and easy to relate to one particular state.
151. See generally Electronic Privacy Information Center Comments, Docket Nos. CG 02-278,
DA 05-2975, at 18 (Jan. 13, 2006), https://epic.org/wp-content/uploads/privacy/telemarketing/tcpa
com11306.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Z8Z-EU8D] [hereinafter EPIC Comments] (arguing that the
“harms” caused by a “patchwork of state laws” is negligible for the telemarketing industry, which
has thrived under such a regime for over a decade).
152. See, e.g., Supreme Court Upholds N.D. Telemarketing Law, BISMARCK TRIB. (Oct. 10,
2006), https://bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-regional/supreme-court-upholds-n-d-telemark
eting-law/article_19f5595e-92e3-5839-9aa6-c14cf01fb477.html [https://perma.cc/X8ZF-3GQ4];
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42–288(c) (2021).
153. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018).
154. Gray, supra note 117.
155. 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2018), amended by Pub. L. No. 106–346, § 101(a), 114 Stat. 1356,
1356A–24; 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2018); 29 U.S.C. § 2009 (2018).
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establishing minimum requirements while permitting state governments to create more restrictive rules. They are also similar to the
TCPA in that they were older statutes that regulated localized personal
data, which does not present complicated compliance costs.
C. Field Preemption
The Cable Act was an amendment to the Communications Act of
1934,156 which was Congress’s attempt to deregulate the cable industry and promote competition in cable communications.157 The Cable
Act’s dual approach to federal preemption in the technological communications arena involves giving expansive regulatory authority to
the FCC158 while carving out specific areas in which state law is preserved. Although the statute’s original purpose was to provide a strong
federal baseline and preserve certain state laws, the Cable Act’s progression—particularly through the FCC—provides an example of
when federal law ended up occupying the cable communications field
“so comprehensively” that it left little to no room for supplementary
state legislation.159 This transition occurred over time as the FCC successfully used its regulatory authority to establish preemptive national
standards in court and through promulgating rules.160 However, to be
clear, field preemption does not involve a total preemption of state
laws dictated by Congress—rather, it refers to a “clash between a constitutional exercise of Congress’s legislative power and conflicting
state law.”161
As a general rule, the Cable Act gives the FCC “express and expansive” jurisdictional authority over certain technologies.162 The
FCC’s primary jurisdictional authority dictates the nature and scope
156. The Communications Act of 1934 created and empowered the Federal Communications
Commission to oversee and regulate telephone, telegraph, and radio communications. 47 U.S.C.
§ 151 (2018).
157. Mark R. Herring, The FCC and Five Years of the Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984: Tuning Out the Consumer?, 24 U. RICH. L. REV. 151, 151 n.9 (1989).
158. The FCC is an independent U.S. government agency empowered by Congress to regulate
interstate and international communications. It has primary federal authority to implement and enforce communications law and regulations. About the FCC, supra note 144.
159. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1480 (2018) (quoting R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, 479 U.S. 130, 140 (1986)).
160. See, e.g., Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 700 (1984) (affirming the
FCC’s power to preempt state cable laws).
161. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1480.
162. Mozilla Corp. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 940 F.3d 1, 75 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Comcast Corp. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 600 F.3d 642, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
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of the areas of law it may regulate under different titles of the Cable
Act, which include telecommunications services, radio transmissions,
and cable services.163 The FCC also has limited ancillary jurisdiction
over certain related subjects if they do not exceed the FCC’s general
grant of jurisdiction, are reasonably related to its primary jurisdictional
obligations, and do not interfere with solely intrastate matters. Jurisdictional authority is a threshold issue of the FCC’s preemption authority, but there are additional limitations even if jurisdictional authority is satisfied.
In addition to the jurisdictional requirement, the FCC’s preemption must be “consistent with any express preemption provisions in the
Cable Act.”164 These provisions preserve state regulatory authority
over a particular technology or service and define both the extent of
state authority and the limits of federal authority. For instance, section
253 preserves state regulatory authority in a number of areas including: the ability to protect public safety and welfare, ensure the quality
of telecommunications services, and safeguard the rights of consumers; however, subsection (d) explicitly leaves room for preemption “to
the extent necessary to correct [any] violation or inconsistency” of
subsections (a) and (b).165 Importantly, provisions like section 253(d)
leave room for dispute over whether a state law is “inconsistent” with
the FCC’s actions.
In situations where the federal and state regimes collide, the FCC
holds an advantage over state authority due to the Supremacy Clause
and the broad authority conferred upon the FTC by the Cable Act. As
a result, courts have been hesitant to disturb the FCC’s preemption
decisions unless the FCC clearly violates its statutory bounds or diverges from congressional intent. In rare cases where preemption
would impact the “usual constitutional balance” between states and
the federal government, courts have required a “clear statement” from
Congress giving the FCC the authority to preempt.166
163. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779, 2785, 2801.
164. CHRIS D. LINEBAUGH & ERIC N. HOLMES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46736, STEPPING IN:
THE FCC’S AUTHORITY TO PREEMPT STATE LAWS UNDER THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT 8 (2021),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46736 [https://perma.cc/2K9E-7X4D].
165. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. §§ 253(a)–(d) (2018); see also 47
U.S.C. § 152(b) (2018) (expressly prohibiting the FCC from regulating exclusively intrastate services under its ancillary jurisdiction); 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A) (2018) (preserving state regulatory
authority over personal wireless service facilities).
166. See, e.g., Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 127 (2004) (holding that the FCC
could not preempt a state statute that prevented municipalities and public utilities from providing
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The scope of the FCC’s preemption authority has been regularly
challenged in litigation, especially in complex situations where specific statutory provisions of the Cable Act are at issue. The FCC’s
power under Congress has frequently prevailed, although its preemption authority is still evaluated on a case-by-case basis, and recent case
law demonstrates the difficulty in achieving field preemption power
over complex interstate commerce such as communication services.
For example, in 2018, the FCC used its preemption authority to reverse a rule imposing net-neutrality requirements on broadband internet access service providers and preempted any state laws that would
continue to enforce the net neutrality requirements.167 In turn, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected the FCC’s “sweeping
preemption” of “any” state net-neutrality laws, but left room for the
FCC to preempt laws on a case-by-case basis under principles of conflict preemption.168 Even more recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals issued a decision to uphold California’s net neutrality law,
rejecting arguments that the law was barred by field preemption of the
Act.169
V. A LAYERED APPROACH TO PRIVACY PREEMPTION
In the data privacy arena, it is clear that preemption is necessary,
and a federal privacy law is inevitably on the horizon. But preserving
the states’ robust roles in furthering the national objective is also important. Finding a middle ground for a preemptive federal law involves a careful balancing of interests and regulatory authorities to
build a strong national baseline without encroaching on the important

telecommunications services or facilities because the Cable Act lacks a clear statutory statement
supporting preemption); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (explaining that, because
States should have exclusive power to choose their own constitutional officers, federal courts must
be certain of Congress’s intent before allowing interference and overriding this balance).
167. See Restoring Internet Freedom, WC Docket No. 17-108, Declaratory Ruling, Report and
Order, and Order, 33 FCC Rcd. 311, 427 (2018).
168. Conflict preemption requires a fact-intensive analysis and applies to “state law that, under
the circumstances of the particular case, stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress—whether that ‘obstacle’ goes by the name of conflicting; contrary to; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; interference, or the like.” Mozilla Corp. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 940 F.3d 1, 74, 85 (D.C.
Cir. 2019).
169. ACA Connects–Am.’s Commc’ns Ass’n v. Bonta, 24 F.4th 1233, 1247–48 (9th Cir. 2022)
(citing La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 476 U.S. 355, 375 (1986)) (“The Communications Act itself reflects a federal scheme that leaves room for state regulation that may touch
on interstate services.”).
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role that states play. Many have proposed a variety of ways to deal
with this situation, but this Note argues that the best solution is proposed by the Brookings Institution, which published a report recommending a “tiered approach” to preemption to balance federal and
state interests.170 Specifically, federal legislators could use the general
structure of the Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act (COPRA) bill,171
which provides a comprehensive model of state and federal duality,
and revise some of its provisions based on certain aspects of the three
models of preemption and related statutes, outlined in Part IV. In addition, adding a sunset clause would require legislators to reassess the
impact of the law on state and federal interests and make necessary
adjustments to stay on track with technological advancements and any
privacy issues that may arise.172
A. Revising the General Structure of the Consumer Online Privacy
Rights Act
Senator Maria Cantwell of Washington introduced the COPRA
bill in late 2019 that would establish privacy rights, outlaw harmful
and deceptive practices, and improve data security safeguards on a national scale.173 This bill, like several others, was introduced with the
purpose of preempting state privacy laws such as the CCPA. Although
it is not the first federal privacy bill to explicitly address state law
preemption, COPRA provides the most comprehensive baseline
model that, with some revisions, would align with both federal and
state interests.174
Much like other privacy bills that have been proposed, COPRA
seeks to “give Americans control over their personal data . . . [and establish] strict standards for the collection, use, sharing, and protection
of consumer data.”175 Notably, although consumer advocates have
generally lobbied against preemption, COPRA has been endorsed by

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

KERRY ET AL., supra note 18, at 16–19.
Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act, S. 2968, 116th Cong. (2019).
KERRY ET AL., supra note 18, at 18–19.
See generally Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act, S. 2968, 116th Cong. (2019).
Adam Schwartz, Sen. Cantwell Leads with New Consumer Data Privacy Bill, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/12/sen-cantwell-leads-new
-consumer-data-privacy-bill [https://perma.cc/6P3G-2KVN].
175. Press Release, Maria Cantwell, U.S. Sen., Senate Democrats Unveil Strong Online Privacy
Rights (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.cantwell.senate.gov/news/press-releases/cantwell-senatedemocrats-unveil-strong-online-privacy-rights [https://perma.cc/M6CJ-JRY7].
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several consumer and civil rights advocates—probably because it focuses on preserving consumer control over personal information and
leaves room for state policy experimentation outside of preemption.176
COPRA expressly limits its preemption provisions by carving out
exceptions that preserve state laws and regulatory power. In addition
to section 302(b),177 which lists several types of state laws that
COPRA will not preempt, COPRA will not preempt any state law that
provides stronger protection for consumer privacy rights. Section
302(c) states, in pertinent part: “[T]his Act shall supersede any State
law to the extent such law directly conflicts with the provisions of this
Act . . . and then only to the extent of such direct conflict. . . . Any
State law, rule, or regulation shall not be considered in direct conflict
if it affords a greater level of protection to individuals protected under
this Act.”178
The language of section 302(c) creates two issues that would undermine the goal of preemption, which is to set a strong national standard for privacy practices, compliance systems, and consumer expectations.
First, the phrase “directly conflicts” is too narrow, inevitably fueling debate over whether a state law “conflicts” with COPRA in a “direct” manner. Instead, COPRA should borrow broader language from
statutes like the Cable Act that preempts “inconsistent” laws. 179 It is
important to note that interpretation issues with preemption cannot be
totally avoided when it comes to splitting regulatory authority between
state and federal entities, as demonstrated by some notable cases challenging preemption under the Cable Act, but the FCC’s definitions of
what is or is not “consistent” has repeatedly prevailed in court.180 It is
also helpful to clarify that COPRA only preempts state laws regulating
the collection, processing, sharing, and selling of data covered under
176. Id.
177. The types of state laws that will not be preempted include: general consumer protection
laws regulating deceptive, unfair, or unconscionable practices; civil rights laws; student and employee privacy rights laws; etc. Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act, S. 2968, 116th Cong.
§ 302(b) (2019).
178. Id. § 302(c) (emphasis added).
179. “Except as provided in section 557 of this title, any provision of law of any State, political
subdivision, or agency thereof, or franchising authority, or any provision of any franchise granted
by such authority, which is inconsistent with this chapter shall be deemed to be preempted and
superseded.” 47 U.S.C. § 556(c) (2018).
180. See, e.g., Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 704 (1984); Mozilla Corp. v.
Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 940 F.3d 1, 80 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
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the law. As such, the language of section 302(c) should be revised to
avoid confusion. The Brookings Institution “recommend[s] the
preemption of state laws ‘regulating the collection, processing, sharing, and security of covered data to the extend such law is inconsistent’
with the federal law or regulation.”181
Second, the phrase “afford a greater level of protection” would
permit states to override preemption, simply by enacting privacy laws
that place greater restrictions on entities than would the federal law.
This provision should be removed, per the Brookings Institution’s recommendation, to avoid undermining the strength of federal preemption.182 Taking this approach would place COPRA in the weakest
preemption bucket along with the TCPA, and a patchwork of state
laws that conflict with each other—even if they do not conflict with
the federal law—would eventually emerge.183 Because COPRA would
regulate a majority of entities doing business across state lines and internet-related data collection practices, personal data is far less localized due to the nature of modern information sharing. As a result, the
law would not find as much success with limited preemption over state
laws like the TCPA did. Furthermore, although a patchwork of state
privacy laws may provoke congressional action, a lack of consensus
stemming from the political divide over privacy protections could stall
the legislation process.184
The layered approach to preemption draws specific features from
“preemption of conflicting laws” and “express preemption.”185 The
Cable Act also offers important insights into how giving federal agencies strong enforcement and rulemaking authority can create “field
preemption” down the line, but giving the FTC express rulemaking
authority in an effective manner will require years of congressional
support and experimentation,186 the nuances of which are outside the
scope of this discussion. In the meantime, Congress may choose to
work towards bolstering the FTC’s capabilities and, in the future, reassess integrating stronger FTC rulemaking authority into COPRA’s
statutory framework.

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

KERRY ET AL., supra note 18, at 17 (emphasis added).
Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 4.
See infra Sections IV.A–B.
See infra Section III.A.
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B. Adding a Sunset Clause
As the final layer to preemption, the Brookings Institution recommends adding a sunset clause to expire certain provisions in the new
law.187 This Note supports this recommendation for two main reasons.
First, expiring a provision within the law, on a certain date can reduce
the risk of legislative complacency. The looming “sunset” date will
leave room for the effects of legislation to unfold naturally, and any
provisions that might prove ineffective or require updating are more
likely to be addressed upon expiration, when Congress is forced to
reassess the law and resolve issues that may have arisen. Of course, it
is likely that this scenario will revive the conflict between state and
federal interests, where industry advocates might lobby for the sunset
clause’s removal, while consumer privacy advocates would seek to
improve the law and keep the clause in place. An illustrative example
of this type of conflict occurred with the FCRA’s sunset clause.188 A
sunset clause would assist lawmakers in making difficult decisions relating to the complexities and “experimental nature” of data privacy.189
Second, instead of sunsetting the entire law and forcing Congress
to address every provision, the sunset clause should focus on provisions that implicate the balance between state and federal interests,
much like the FCRA’s clause. Balancing state and federal interests requires revisiting and modifying the amounts of regulatory power afforded to each regime. Furthermore, stimulating the privacy dialogue
between the two regimes will ensure that concerns from both ends are
heard. As a preliminary suggestion, applying a partial sunset clause to
the recommended structure of COPRA discussed in this paper would
be a good start. Specifically, Congress should implement a sunset

187. KERRY ET AL., supra note 18, at 7, 18. A sunset clause is a legal provision that provides
for the automatic termination of a government program, agency, or law on a certain date unless the
legislature affirmatively acts to renew it. Stephen R. Latham, Sunset Law, BRITANNICA (Apr. 8,
2020), https://www.britannica.com/topic/sunset-law [https://perma.cc/9SBV-PY42].
188. “The financial services industry wants Congress to reauthorize national standards, [while]
consumer advocates . . . are urging Congress to give the states a role in creating credit policies in
the . . . areas they’re currently barred . . . .” Eileen Alt Powell, ‘Sunset’ Provisions in Fair Credit
Reporting Act Spark Debate, ARIZ. DAILY SUN (May 17, 2003), https://azdailysun.com/sunset-pro
visions-in-fair-credit-reporting-act-spark-debate/article_c9b46271-0580-5a02-b90e-6bfc4c951b5
9.html [https://perma.cc/K43B-7SGP].
189. See RICHARD C. SHELBY, AMENDING FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT, S. REP. NO. 108166, at 6 (2003) (Congress chose to add a sunset clause because the “experimental nature of [the
FCRA] provisions” would necessitate future review of the effects).
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clause, taking effect between five and eight years190 from enactment,
to reinstate the original language that allows states to enact laws that
“afford a greater level of protection” without being preempted.191 In
the meantime, the federal law can offer overdue satisfactory protections that will temporarily reconcile polarizing interests. The sunset
clause would give state and federal regulators adequate time to assess
the effectiveness of the new federal law and identify the areas in which
states can contribute with policy experimentation once the provision
expires. Discussions between advocacy groups are certain to emerge,
especially since provisions affecting state and federal interests would
face risk of termination, and Congress can take these into consideration along with the effectiveness of the current preemption structure
when determining whether modifications should be made.
VI. CONCLUSION
The emerging state privacy laws have revived important conversations about the costs and benefits of data privacy to consumers and
businesses in the context of the digital era. Likewise, they have revived
conversations about the benefits and limitations of federal and state
regulatory regimes, and how privacy protections can become too weak
or too strong if the correct balance is not struck. In addition, the pace
at which data privacy and technology evolves will continue to present
challenges for legislation, and lawmakers should be as adaptive as
possible, even though it might be impossible for the legal landscape to
fully catch up to developments in the digital domain. While the solution presented here does not completely reconcile the polarized views
on federal privacy preemption, it will at least provide some compromise and reprieve as lawmakers continue to navigate options to ensure
strong privacy protections and uniformity.

190. The inspiration for this time range is drawn from the FCRA’s statutory language, which
contained a sunset clause of eight years after enactment. Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15
U.S.C. § 1681 (2018).
191. Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act, S. 2968, 116th Cong. § 302(c) (2019).

